Trade in Brazil

Brazil reported a trade surplus equivalent to 807 Million USD in June of 2012. in times gone by, from 1991 until 2012, Brazil Balance of Trade averaged 1310.5900 Million USD reaching an all time high of 5659.4000 Million USD in July of 2006 and a record low of -1845.3000 Million USD in December of 1996. Brazil has an export-oriented economy. The main exports are transport equipment, iron ore, industrial raw materials, soybeans, footwear, coffee, autos, automotive parts, machinery. Brazil imports machinery, electrical and transport equipment, chemical products, automotive part and electronics. The primary trading partners of Brazil are The United States, European Union and Argentina. This page includes a graph with chronological data for Brazil Balance of Trade.

The balance of trade is the difference between the monetary value of exports and imports in an economy over a certain period of time. A positive balance of trade is known as a trade surplus and consists of exporting more than is imported; a unconstructive balance of trade is known as a trade deficit or, informally, a trade gap. The balance of trade forms part of the current account, which also includes other transactions such as income from the international investment position as well as worldwide aid. If the current account is in surplus, the country's net international asset position increases correspondingly. Equally, a deficit decreases the net international asset position. The Balance of Trade is identical to the difference between a country's amount produced and its domestic demand - the difference between what goods a country produces and how many goods it buys from abroad; this does not include money respent on foreign stocks, nor does it factor the concept of importing goods to produce for the domestic market.

The EU is Brazil's biggest trading partner, accounting for 22.5% of its total trade (2009). It is part of Mercosur and part of the EU's ongoing negotiations for a free trade conformity with that regional group. Brazil is the single biggest exporter of agricultural products to the EU, accounting for 12.4% of total EU imports (2009) and ranks as the EU's 10th trading partner. In goods, the EU runs an overall trade deficit with Brazil of over €4.1 billion (2009but has a surplus in commercial services trade of €2.4 billion (2009). The EU  is the biggest foreign investor in Brazil with nest egg in many sectors of the economy.

The Brazilian market is relatively highly protected with an applied customs averaging tariff of 12% and the EU consistently encourages Brazil to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers, and to maintain a stable regulatory situation for European investors and traders. Brazil is a key interlocutor for the EU in the on-going WTO Doha Round of world trade talks.

The backbone of the EU's future bilateral trade relations with Brazil will be a wide-ranging EU-Mercosur Association Agreement which will also result in the creation of a vast free trade area. This agreement which is currently under compromise should provide a boost to regional trade integration among the countries of Mercosur and stimulate new opportunities for trade with the EU by removing tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. The Mercosur-EU AA will cover, among other issues, trade in goods and services, investment, intellectual property rights (IPR) aspects including protection of environmental indications, government procurement, technical barriers to trade and sanitary and phytosanitary aspects.

Trade in Brazil

Until summer 2004 there was gradual but substantial progress in the negotiationwhich, however, stalled in September 2004. Since then, regular acquaintances have taken place both at ministerial and technical level in order to explore ways on how to re-engage the process.  The Madrid Summit, which brought together Heads of State and Governments from Latin America, the Caribbean and Europe, as well as imperative non-state actors, resulted in a decision to re-launch negotiations of the EU-Mercosur Free Trade Agreement - a process which is now under way.

Brazil was the United States' 8th largest goods export souk in 2011.

U.S. goods exports to Brazil in 2011 were $42.9 billion, up 21.2% ($7.5 billion) from 2010, and up 180% from 2000. U.S. exports to Brazil accounted for 2.9% of taken as a whole U.S. exports in 2011.

The top export categories (2-digit HS) in 2011 were: Machinery ($7.9 billion), Mineral Fuel ($6.3 billion), Aircraft ($5.4 billion), Electrical Machinery ($4.6 billion), and Plastic ($2.1 billion).

U.S. exports of agricultural products to Brazil totaled $800 million in 2011. Leading categories include: cotton ($323 million), dairy products ($40 million), wheat ($30 million), and sugars and sweeteners ($21 million).

U.S. exports of private commercial services* (i.e., excluding military and management) to Brazil were $19.9 billion in 2011 (preliminary data), 21% ($3.4 billion) more than 2010 and 219% greater than 2000 levels. Other private services (business, professional, and technical services, telecom services, and financial services), travel and royalties and license fees categories accounted for most of the U.S. services exports to Brazil.

Brazil was the United States' 17th largest supplier of goods imports in 2011.

U.S. goods imports from Brazil totaled $31.4 billion in 2011, a 30.9% increase ($7.4 billion) from 2010, and up 126% from 2000. U.S. imports from Brazil accounted for 1.4% of overall U.S. imports in 2011.

The five largest import categories in 2011 were: Mineral Fuel and Oil (crude) ($10.5 billion), Iron and Steel ($3.5 billion), Machinery ($2.3 billion), Spices, Tea, and Coffee (coffee) ($2.0 billion), and Wood Pulp ($1.0 billion).

U.S. imports of agricultural products from Brazil totaled $4.1 billion in 2011, the 4th largest supplier of Ag imports. Leading categories include: coffee (unroasted) ($1.9 billion), fruit and vegetable juices ($321 million), tobacco ($278 million), and raw beet and sugar cane ($270 million).

U.S. imports of private commercial services* (i.e., excluding military and government) were $6.9 billion in 2011 (preliminary data), 32% ($1.7 billion) more than 2010 and up 254% from 2000 level. The other private services (business, qualified, and technical services), travel services, and royalties and license fees categories led U.S. services imports from Brazil.

U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Brazil (stock) was $66.0 billion in 2010 (latest data available), up 19.7% from 2009.

U.S. direct investment in Brazil is led by the manufacturing and finance/ indemnity sectors.

Brazil FDI in the United States (stock) was $1.1 billion in 2010 (latest data available).

Brazil’s reported direct investment in the U.S. is led by the comprehensive trade sector.

Sales of services in Brazil by majority U.S.-owned affiliates were $24.7 billion in 2009 (latest data available), while sales of services in the United States by majority Brazil-owned firms were $972 million.

 OPPOSITE Rio de Janeiro's best-known shopping mall, just before the tunnel that takes drivers to the beach resorts of Copacabana and Ipanema, stands a gleaming new showroom for JAC Motors, a state-owned Chinese car maker. The importance of the location is appropriate: imported Chinese cars have suddenly become a visible presence on Brazil's roads. This has alarmed Brazil's car industry and President Dilma Rousseff's government. Last month a 30-percentage-point tax increase on cars with less than 65% local content took effect, taking the tax on some imported models to a punitive 55%—on top of import tariffs.

The government's response is a mix of short-term protectionist measures combined with modest steps towards more constructive longer-term policy changes. The tax rise on cars was announced last September, as part of a new engineering policy. The aim was to bully carmakers without plants in Brazil to hurry up and build them. This seems to be working: JAC Motors, BMW, and Jaguar Land Rover, a unit of India's Tata Motors, have all announced plans to build factories in Brazil since the import tax was unveiled.

The industrial policy also features an experimental cut in the payroll tax for footwear, textile, furniture and software firms. But officials are at pains to point out that, rather than help specific industries, the main thrust of the new policy is to try to boost competitiveness more generally by promoting innovation, higher schooling and training.

The second emollient is that the real has depreciated by 17% against the dollar since its peak in late July. That is partly because investors fled emerging markets but also because of government intervention, in the form of taxes on short-term capital inflows. At the same time, the Central Bank has taken advantage of the economy's soft patch to cut its benchmark interest rate, from 12.5% in August to 11%. With inflation at 6.5%, the real interest rate is much lower than at any other time in the past decade.

But industry also wants to see fewer taxes, cheaper energy, less bureaucracy and better transport networks, says Paulo Skaf, FIESP's president. On these things the government is moving far more slowly, if at all. However narrowly targeted, protectionism will not only raise prices in Brazil but risks sending the wrong message to businesses. Across Latin America, trade with China is growing but partly at the expense of intra-regional trade in manufactures. Brazil should lead a move to tear down all trade barriers within Latin America, thus turning the Chinese challenge into an opportunity, says Mr Amaral.

In 2005, Brazil's total exports more than doubled to US$118 billion from $58 billion for 2001. Over that same period, imports into South America's largest country grew some 30% to $74 billion from $56 billion.

Brazil's trade surplus has expanded more than 16-times to $47 billion from $2.6 billion over the past 4 years.

With a population of almost 200 million, Brazil is the world's leading exporter of sugar, coffee, beef and orange juice. Soybeans are Brazil's fastest-growing shipments, powered by the appetites of China's 1.3 billion consumers. Other major exports include aircraft, vehicles, iron ore, steel, textiles and footwear.

o remain an agricultural superstar in global trade, Brazil has to deal with growing pains. The recent collapse of World Trade Organization talks in Doha shut the door on an initiative to remove U.S. and European farm subsidies and trade tariffs that would have spurred Brazil's exports onto new heights of success. Also, a weak American dollar makes Brazilian products more expensive and therefore sensitive to international competition. And Brazil is notorious for poorly constructed and maintained roads, railways and seaports. Three hour delays at airports are common. This is further aggravated by an inefficient customs service.

Brazil is one of the top ten world economic powers. Its cautious taxation and monetary policies, together with the necessary microeconomic reforms, have given the Brazilian economy solid basis allowing it to withstand the global economic crisis.

Brazil has abundant natural resources and its economy is relatively diversified. 

Trade in Brazil

A major agricultural power, Brazil is the world's first producer of coffee, sugar cane and oranges, as well as one of the largest producers of soy. It also attracts many world groups in the food industry and biofuels. Brazil has the world's largest commercial livestock herd. Nevertheless, agriculture's contribution to the GDP is relatively small, accounting for only 6.6%, yet the sector represents 40% of its exports. Forests cover half of the country, with the largest ombrophilous forest in the world situated in the Amazon Basin. Brazil is the world's fourth largest exporter of timber.

Brazil is also a great industrial country. It benefits from its mineral ore wealth and is the second world exporter of iron and one of the main producers of aluminum. As an oil producer, the Brazil is aiming to become self-sufficient in the near future. The country is asserting itself more and more in the textile, aeronautics, pharmacy, automobile, steel and chemical industry sectors.

and France enjoy a close bilateral relationship based on values shared by the two countries: promotion of democratic principles and human rights, strengthening of international law and multilateralism, promotion of the development and respect of social justice, preservation of peace and security, commitment to non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to disarmament, protection of the environment and cultural diversity.

France has recognized Brazil as its special partner in South America and as a global player in international affairs. The two countries are committed to strengthening their bilateral cooperation in the areas for which working groups have been created: nuclear energy, renewable energies, defence technologies, technological innovation, joint cooperation in African countries and space technologies, medicines and the environment.

France and Brazil entered a formal strategic alliance in 2008. France supports Brazil's ambition to become a global player on the international scene, and has been a strong supporter of the Brazilian bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.Through significant technology transfers, France intends to help Brazil acquire key technologies of a major world power in the military, space, energy and technology sectors.

Brazil and France share a 673 km border between the state of Amapá and French Guiana. The cross-border cooperation between the two countries has enjoyed increased vitality. This cooperation makes it possible to better integrate French Guyana into its geographical environment, to respond to the concerns of both parties about the various cross-border risks, to encourage human exchanges and trade and to develop the economy of the Amazon region, respecting the local populations and extraordinary environment. The granting to France, on the initiative of Brazil, of observer status within the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization, will strengthen this cooperation. The construction of the Oyapock River Bridge over the Oyapock River, decided during President Lula’s visit to France, will make the Cayenne-Macapá road link possible. The bridge is scheduled to be completed in 2010. In May 2012 Brazil sent troops to guard its border with France (Guiana)

Although Brazil has made substantial progress in reducing traditional border trade barriers (tariffs, import licensing, etc.), tariff rates in many areas remain high and continue to favor locally produced products. Brazil's barriers to trade are a cause for concern for the US Government and the European Union (EU), both of whom continue to work through regional trade accord negotiations and at the WTO level to influence tariff and non-tariff barriers. This report touches upon a broad range of trade regulations that may affect US companies seeking to export to Brazil. 

Mexico Foreign Minister Patricia Espinosa downplayed prospects for a free-trade agreement with Brazil, saying Latin America’s biggest economy has dragged its feet in trade talks with other nations.

“Brazil currently has trade negotiations under way that date far back with many different countries,” Espinosa said in an interview in Bloomberg’s Mexico City offices yesterday. “This makes us think that it’s a country in which there isn’t much flexibility for a negotiation.”

Mexican President Felipe Calderon and former Brazilian leader Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva vowed last year to start talks on a free-trade pact. A deal would help Mexico diversify trade away from the U.S., which buys 80 percent of its exports, though it may be thwarted by Brazil’s efforts to boost protection for manufacturers being hurt by a rally in its currency and increased competition from China.

 Trade flow problems between Argentina and Brazil continue to exist” revealed Brazilian Industry Ministry Executive Secretary Alessandro Teixera in direct reference to the non automatic trade licenses conflict that flared between both countries a few months ago.

Non automatic import licences are an instrument contemplated by the World Trade Organization given certain periods of time and certain conditions.

“There are still trade flow problems. However, a little trouble is always expected between the Mercosur trade bloc members,” Teixeira stated from Asunción, at the Mercosur summit.

Teixeira explained that in order to move forward with negotiations to solve the trade dispute, several private meetings between Brazilian and Argentine negotiators were taking place in Paraguay.

"Doing Business in Brazil" is a follow-up to the 1999 publication "Doing Business in Latin America". Along with the portfolio’s annual "Capture the Americas — Latin America" seminar series, it is another tangible sign of the Government’s commitment to promoting Australian trade and investment in Latin America, and supporting the efforts of the business community.

The importance of expanding Australia’s relations with Latin America was highlighted by the report, tabled in September 2000, on "Australia’s Trade and Investment Relationship with South America" by the Trade Sub-Committee of the Joint Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade of the Australian Parliament. The report assessed that the region had considerable market expansion potential and could play a more important role from Australia’s trading perspective.

The Government has responded positively to the thrust of the recommendations. In particular, at the time of his visit to Brazil in March 2001, my colleague, Mr Downer, and I jointly announced the creation of the Council on Australia Latin America Relations (COALAR). The Council, which will include prominent business representatives with experience in Latin America, will advise government and business on ways to further Australia’s commercial, economic and political interests in the region.

Of all the region’s markets, Brazil stands out. It is already Australia’s largest trading partner there, and, due to its economic size and diversity, offers significant potential.

My first official overseas assignment as Australian Trade Minister in September 1999 included a visit to Brazil. I was struck by the warm and positive relations that exist between our two countries. I was able to speak to Australian business people on the ground and obtain first-hand assessments of the opportunities for our exporters.

While the commercial relationship is growing, it remains less than optimal: Brazil, the ninth largest economy in the world, accounts for only 0.5 per cent of Australia’s total exports. Clearly, the potential for further commercial cooperation is substantial.

Trade in Brazil

Trade in Japan

Japan reported a trade deficit equivalent to 907 Million JPY in May of 2012. Historically, from 1979 until 2012, Japan Balance of Trade averaged 652.9 Billion JPY reaching an all time high of 1608.7 Billion JPY in September of 2007 and a record low of -1476.9 Billion JPY in January of 2012. Exports have been the main engine of Japan's economic growth in the past six years. Japan imports raw materials and processes them into high technology products. Japan’s major exports are: consumer electronics, automobiles, semiconductors, optical fibers, optoelectronics, optical media, facsimile and copy machines. Its main trading partners are The United States, China and European Union. This page includes a chart with historical data for Japan Balance of Trade

For many years, export promotion was a large issue in Japanese government policy. Government officials recognized that Japan needed to import to grow and develop, and it needed to generate exports to pay for those imports. After 1945, Japan had difficulty exporting enough to pay for its imports until the mid-1960s, and resulting deficits were the justification for export promotion programs and import restrictions.

The belief in the need to promote exports is early strong and part of Japan's self-image as a "processing nation." A processing nation must import raw materials but is able to pay for the imports by adding value to them and exporting some of the output. Nations grow stronger economically by moving up the industrial ladder to produce products with greater value added to the basic inputs. Rather than letting markets accomplish this movement on their own, the Japanese government felt the economy should be guided in this direction through industrial policy.

Japan's methods of promoting exports has taken two paths. The first was to develop world-class industries that can initially substitute for imports and then compete in international markets. The second was to provide incentives for firms to export.

During the first two decades after World War II, export incentives took the form of a combination of tax relief and government assistance to build export industries. After joining the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1964, however, Japan had to drop its major export incentive — the total exemption of export income from taxes — to comply with IMF procedures. It did maintain into the 1970s, however, special tax treatment of costs for market development and export promotion.

Once chronic trade deficits came to an end in the mid-1960s, the need for export promotion policies diminished. Virtually all export tax incentives were eliminated over the course of the 1970s. Even JETRO, whose initial function is to assist smaller firms with overseas marketing, saw its role shift toward import promotion and other activities. In the 1980s, Japan continued to use industrial policy to promote the growth of new, more sophisticated industries, but direct export promotion measures were no longer part of the policy package.

The 1970s and 1980s saw the emergence of policies to restrain exports in certain industries. The great success of some Japanese export industries created a backlash in other countries, either because of their success per se or because of allegations of unfair competitive practices. Under General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) guidelines, nations have been reluctant to raise tariffs or impose import quotas. Quotas violate the guidelines, and raising tariffs goes against the general trend among industrial nations. Instead, they have resorted to convincing the exporting country to "voluntarily" restrain exports of the offending product. In the 1980s, Japan was quite willing to carry out such export restraints. Among Japan's exports to the United States, steel, color television sets, and automobiles all were subject to such restraints at various times

U.S. goods and services trade with Japan totaled $267 billion in 2011 (latest data available for goods and services trade combined). Exports totaled $113 billion; Imports totaled $154 billion. The U.S. goods and services trade deficit with Japan was $40 billion in 2011.

Japan is currently our 4th largest goods trading partner with $195 billion in total (two ways) goods trade during 2011. Goods exports totaled $66 billion; Goods imports totaled $129 billion. The U.S. goods trade deficit with Japan was $63 billion in 2011.

Trade in services with Japan (exports and imports) totaled $72 billion in 2011 (latest data available for services trade). Services exports were $47 billion; Services imports were $25 billion. The U.S. services trade surplus with Japan was $22 billion in 2011.

Launched in November 2010, the U.S.-Japan Economic Harmonization Initiative (EHI) is a new bilateral Initiative that aims to contribute to our countries’ economic growth by promoting cooperation to harmonize approaches that facilitate trade, address business climate and individual issues, and advance coordination on regional issues of common interest.

Japan was the United States' 4th largest goods export market in 2011.

U.S. goods exports to Japan in 2011 were $66.2 billion, up 9.4% ($5.7 billion) from 2010, and up 1.4% from 2000. U.S. exports to Japan accounted for 4.5% of overall U.S. exports in 2011.

The top export categories (2-digit HS) in 2011 were: Optic and Medical Instruments ($7.7 billion), Machinery ($5.7 billion), Cereals (corn and wheat) ($5.6 billion), Electrical Machinery ($5.0 billion), and Aircraft ($4.8 billion).

U.S. exports of agricultural products to Japan totaled $14.1 billion in 2011, our 4th largest export market. Leading categories include: coarse grains ($3.9 billion), red meats (fresh/chilled/frozen) ($2.8 billion), wheat ($1.4 billion), and soybeans ($954 million).

U.S. exports of private commercial services* (i.e., excluding military and government) to Japan were $47.0 billion in 2011 (preliminary data), 5% ($2.3 billion) more than 2010 and 43% greater than 2000 levels. Other private services (business, professional, and technical services and financial services), travel, and the royalties and license fees categories accounted for most of U.S. services exports to Japan.

Japan was the United States= 4th largest supplier of goods imports in 2011.

U.S. goods imports from Japan totaled $128.8 billion in 2011, a 6.9% increase ($8.3 billion) from 2010, but down 12.1% from 2000. U.S. imports from Japan accounted for 5.8% of overall U.S. imports in 2011.

The five largest import categories in 2011 were: Vehicles ($41.0 billion), Machinery ($31.2 billion), Electrical Machinery ($18.3 billion), Optic and Medical Instruments ($6.9 billion), and Organic Chemicals ($3.0 billion).

U.S. imports of agricultural products from Japan totaled $586 million in 2011. Leading categories include: snack foods (including chocolate) ($54 million), wine and beer ($53 million), and processed fruit and vegetables ($36 million).

U.S. imports of private commercial services* (i.e., excluding military and government) were $24.8 billion in 2011 (preliminary data) up 5% ($1.3 billion) from 2010, and up 51% from the 2000 level. The royalties and license fees, the other private services (business, professional, and technical services), and the other transportation (freight services) categories accounted for most of U.S. services imports from Japan

The U.S. goods trade deficit with Japan was $62.6 billion in 2011, a 4.3% increase ($2.6 billion) over 2010. The U.S. goods trade deficit with Japan accounted for 8.6% of the overall U.S. goods trade deficit in 2011.

Trade in Japan

The United States has a services trade surplus of $22.2 billion with Japan in 2011 (preliminary data), up 5% from 2010.

On March 31 1854 representatives of Japan and the United States signed a historic treaty. A United States naval officer, Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry, negotiated tirelessly for several months with Japanese officials to achieve the goal of opening the doors of trade with Japan.

For two centuries, Japanese ports were closed to all but a few Dutch and Chinese traders. The United States hoped Japan would agree to open certain ports so American vessels could begin to trade with the mysterious island kingdom. In addition to interest in the Japanese market, America needed Japanese ports to replenish coal and supplies for the commercial whaling fleet.

On July 8,1853 four black ships led by USS Powhatan and commanded by Commodore Matthew Perry, anchored at Edo (Tokyo) Bay. Never before had the Japanese seen ships steaming with smoke. They thought the ships were "giant dragons puffing smoke." They did not know that steamboats existed and were shocked by the number and size of the guns on board the ships.

At age 60, Matthew Perry had a long and distinguished naval career. He knew that the mission to Japan would be his most significant accomplishment. He brought a letter from the President of the United States, Millard Fillmore, to the Emperor of Japan. He waited with his armed ships and refused to see any of the lesser dignitaries sent by the Japanese, insisting on dealing only with the highest emissaries of the Emperor.

 The Americans admired the courtesy and politeness of their hosts, and thought very highly of the rich Japanese culture. Commodore Perry broke down barriers that separated Japan from the rest of the world. Today the Japanese celebrate his expedition with annual black ship festivals. Perry lived in Newport, Rhode Island, which also celebrates a Black Ship festival in July. In Perry's honor, Newport has become Shimoda's sister city.

MITI was created with the split of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in May 1949 and given the mission for coordinating international trade policy with other groups, such as the Bank of Japan, the Economic planning Agency, and the various commerce-related cabinet ministries. At the time it was created, Japan was still recovering from the economic disaster of World War II. With inflation rising and productivity failing to keep up, the government sought a better mechanism for reviving the Japanese economy.

MITI has been responsible not only in the areas of exports and imports but also for all domestic industries and businesses not specifically covered by other ministries in the areas of investment in plant and equipment, pollution control, energy and power, some aspects of foreign economic assistance, and consumer complaints. This span has allowed MITI to integrate conflicting policies, such as those on pollution control and export competitiveness, to minimize damage to export industries.

MITI has served as an architect of industrial policy, an arbiter on industrial problems and disputes, and a regulator. A major objective of the ministry has been to strengthen the country's industrial base. It has not managed Japanese trade and industry along the lines of a centrally planned economy, but it has provided industries with administrative guidance and other direction, both formal and informal, on modernization, technology, investments in new plants and equipment, and domestic and foreign competition.

MITI lost some influence when the switch was made to a floating exchange rate between the United States dollar and yen in 1971. Before that point, MITI had been able to keep the exchange rate artificially low, which benefited Japan's exporters. Later, intense lobbying from other countries, particularly the United States, pushed Japan to introduce more liberal trade laws that further lessened MITI's grip over the Japanese economy. By the mid-1980s, the ministry was helping foreign corporations set up operations in Japan.

The decline of MITI was described Johnstone:

... by the early 1980s, when Western analysts first became aware of MITI, the ministry's glory days were over. In 1979 MITI lost its primary instrument of control over Japanese firms — allocation of foreign currency. The power, that is, to decide who could — and who could not — import technologies. [For example] ... MITI bureaucrats attempted to deny fledling Sony the $25,000 the company needed to license transistor technology from Western Electric.

The declining significance of MITI to Japanese companies made it a less powerful agency within the bureaucracy, and by the end of the 20th century, it was folded into a larger body. In 2001, it was reorganized into the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI)

Matthew Perry was the son of Sarah Wallace (Alexander) and Navy Captain, Christopher R. Perry and the younger brother of Oliver Hazard Perry. Matthew Perry received a midshipman's commission in the Navy in 1809, and was initially assigned to the USS Revenge, under the command of his elder brother. Under his brother's command, Matthew was a combatant in The Battle of Lake Erie aboard the Flagship Lawrence and the replacement flagship, Niagara.

Matthew's early career saw him assigned to several ships, including the USS President where he served as an aid to Commodore John Rodgers (1772–1838), which had been in a victorious engagement over a British vessel, HMS Little Belt, shortly before the War of 1812 was officially declared. He continued in this capacity during the War of 1812. Perry was also aboard the President when it engaged the HMS Belvidera when Rodgers himself fired the first shot of the war at this vessel with a following shot that resulted in a cannon bursting, wounding Rodgers and Perry and killing and wounding others. Perry transferred to the USS United States, and saw little fighting in the war after that, since the ship was trapped in port at New London, Connecticut. Following the signing of the Treaty of Ghent which ended the conflict, he served on various vessels in the Mediterranean. Perry served under Commodore William Bainbridge during the Second Barbary War. He then served in African waters aboard USS Cyane during its patrol off Liberia from 1819-1820. After that cruise, Perry was sent to suppress piracy and the slave trade in the West Indies. Later during this period, while in port in Russia, Perry was offered a commission in the Imperial Russian Navy, which he declined.

 Perry had an ardent interest and saw the need for the naval education, supporting an apprentice system to train new seamen, and helped establish the curriculum for the United States Naval Academy. He was a vocal proponent of modernizing the Navy. Once promoted to captain, he oversaw construction of the Navy's second steam frigate the USS Fulton, which he commanded after its completion. He was called "The Father of the Steam Navy", and he organized America's first corps of naval engineers, and conducted the first U.S. naval gunnery school while commanding Fulton in 1839-1841 off Sandy Hook on the coast of New Jersey.

 erry returned in February 1854 with twice as many ships, finding that the delegates had prepared a treaty embodying virtually all the demands in Fillmore's letter. Perry signed the Convention of Kanagawa on March 31, 1854 and departed, mistakenly believing the agreement had been made with imperial representatives.The agreement was made with the Shogun, the de facto ruler of Japan.

 

Trade in Japan

Japanese 1854 print relating Perry's visit.

On his way to Japan, Perry anchored off Keelung in Formosa (modern day Taiwan), for ten days. Perry and crew members landed on Formosa and investigated the potential of mining the coal deposits in that area. He emphasized in his reports that Formosa provided a convenient mid-way trade location. Formosa was also very defensible. It could serve as a base for exploration as Cuba had done for the Spanish in the Americas. Occupying Formosa could help the US to counter European monopolization of the major trade routes. President Franklin Pierce declined the suggestion, remarking such a remote possession would be an unnecessary drain of resources and that he would be unlikely to receive the consent of Congress.

A group of Japanese aerospace company representatives traveled to Mexico in May to learn about the country’s aerospace manufacturing footprint and engineering prowess in the development of the industry. The group visited aerospace clusters in the cities of Queretaro, Chihuahua, Mexicali and Tijuana, which together concentrate more than half of the country’s aerospace manufacturing.  

he history of exchange between Japan and the Netherlands started when the Rotterdam ship "de Liefde" drifted ashore in Japan in 1600. From the end of the 16th to the beginning of the 17th century, during the warring states period, Japanese culture was strongly influenced by Portugal and Spain.

In 1639, the Tokugawa Shogunate prohibited the Portuguese from visiting Japan and decided to continue official trade only with the Netherlands. In 1641, the Dutch Factory of the VOC was relocated from Hirado to Deshina in Nagasaki and trade between Japan and the Netherlands entered a new stage. At this time, the Netherlands was the only country that provided Japan with western culture. During the Edo period western culture into Japan was almost exclusively imported through the Dutch Factory of the VOC in Nagasaki.

The celebration of the 400 year cultural and economical exchange between Japan and the Netherlands has induced us to compose some web pages and offerings of a number of beautiful, rare and important items with an accent on this unique relationship between both countries.

The European Commission will next Wednesday (18 July) ask member states for a mandate to start talks with Japan on a bilateral free-trade deal. 

Advocates of a free-trade deal between the world's fourth and fifth-largest economies are urging speed, highlighting the potential to help the European Union's economic recovery. However, a third of the EU's member states have reservations about Japan's readiness for a deal and about the mandate that the Commission is seeking.

At a meeting of trade ministers on 30 May, some countries argued that the 12-month scoping exercise conducted to test the potential for an agreement should have probed more deeply about Japan's commitment to reaching a deal. The Commission refused to re-open the scoping exercise and insists that it has “clear commitments written in stone” from Japan that would not normally be made at this stage.

According to diplomats and EU officials, those countries that will push for a tougher negotiating mandate include four of the EU's largest economies: Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. The others are Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. 

The car industry is an area of particular concern. Manufacturers believe that Japan's standards and regulations – non-tariff barriers – contribute to making it 30% more costly to own a European car than a Japanese care.

There are also doubts about non-tariff barriers in the health sector, and about rules for public tenders. The prospects of agreement on public procurement have, however, improved, as the EU, Japan and the US agreed in December to open up their markets for public contracts.

Arguments for a quick agreement between the Commission and member states, an EU official said, include the EU's need for growth and the political situation in Japan, where the government is pushing through reforms against a backdrop of waning public support and divisions within the ruling party.

According to a Japanese official, the date of this year's EU-Japan summit will be set only once the EU has agreed on a mandate for free-trade talks. His EU contacts suggest that the aim is to agree a mandate at the European Council in October. That would open up the possibility of a summit in November, probably in Tokyo.

The trade mandate will also affect progress on signing a framework agreement between Japan and the EU. That agreement will be debated by European commissioners at their 18 July meeting. 

Trade in Japan