Trade in Japan

Japan reported a trade deficit equivalent to 907 Million JPY in May of 2012. Historically, from 1979 until 2012, Japan Balance of Trade averaged 652.9 Billion JPY reaching an all time high of 1608.7 Billion JPY in September of 2007 and a record low of -1476.9 Billion JPY in January of 2012. Exports have been the main engine of Japan's economic growth in the past six years. Japan imports raw materials and processes them into high technology products. Japan’s major exports are: consumer electronics, automobiles, semiconductors, optical fibers, optoelectronics, optical media, facsimile and copy machines. Its main trading partners are The United States, China and European Union. This page includes a chart with historical data for Japan Balance of Trade

For many years, export promotion was a large issue in Japanese government policy. Government officials recognized that Japan needed to import to grow and develop, and it needed to generate exports to pay for those imports. After 1945, Japan had difficulty exporting enough to pay for its imports until the mid-1960s, and resulting deficits were the justification for export promotion programs and import restrictions.

The belief in the need to promote exports is early strong and part of Japan's self-image as a "processing nation." A processing nation must import raw materials but is able to pay for the imports by adding value to them and exporting some of the output. Nations grow stronger economically by moving up the industrial ladder to produce products with greater value added to the basic inputs. Rather than letting markets accomplish this movement on their own, the Japanese government felt the economy should be guided in this direction through industrial policy.

Japan's methods of promoting exports has taken two paths. The first was to develop world-class industries that can initially substitute for imports and then compete in international markets. The second was to provide incentives for firms to export.

During the first two decades after World War II, export incentives took the form of a combination of tax relief and government assistance to build export industries. After joining the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1964, however, Japan had to drop its major export incentive — the total exemption of export income from taxes — to comply with IMF procedures. It did maintain into the 1970s, however, special tax treatment of costs for market development and export promotion.

Once chronic trade deficits came to an end in the mid-1960s, the need for export promotion policies diminished. Virtually all export tax incentives were eliminated over the course of the 1970s. Even JETRO, whose initial function is to assist smaller firms with overseas marketing, saw its role shift toward import promotion and other activities. In the 1980s, Japan continued to use industrial policy to promote the growth of new, more sophisticated industries, but direct export promotion measures were no longer part of the policy package.

The 1970s and 1980s saw the emergence of policies to restrain exports in certain industries. The great success of some Japanese export industries created a backlash in other countries, either because of their success per se or because of allegations of unfair competitive practices. Under General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) guidelines, nations have been reluctant to raise tariffs or impose import quotas. Quotas violate the guidelines, and raising tariffs goes against the general trend among industrial nations. Instead, they have resorted to convincing the exporting country to "voluntarily" restrain exports of the offending product. In the 1980s, Japan was quite willing to carry out such export restraints. Among Japan's exports to the United States, steel, color television sets, and automobiles all were subject to such restraints at various times

U.S. goods and services trade with Japan totaled $267 billion in 2011 (latest data available for goods and services trade combined). Exports totaled $113 billion; Imports totaled $154 billion. The U.S. goods and services trade deficit with Japan was $40 billion in 2011.

Japan is currently our 4th largest goods trading partner with $195 billion in total (two ways) goods trade during 2011. Goods exports totaled $66 billion; Goods imports totaled $129 billion. The U.S. goods trade deficit with Japan was $63 billion in 2011.

Trade in services with Japan (exports and imports) totaled $72 billion in 2011 (latest data available for services trade). Services exports were $47 billion; Services imports were $25 billion. The U.S. services trade surplus with Japan was $22 billion in 2011.

Launched in November 2010, the U.S.-Japan Economic Harmonization Initiative (EHI) is a new bilateral Initiative that aims to contribute to our countries’ economic growth by promoting cooperation to harmonize approaches that facilitate trade, address business climate and individual issues, and advance coordination on regional issues of common interest.

Japan was the United States' 4th largest goods export market in 2011.

U.S. goods exports to Japan in 2011 were $66.2 billion, up 9.4% ($5.7 billion) from 2010, and up 1.4% from 2000. U.S. exports to Japan accounted for 4.5% of overall U.S. exports in 2011.

The top export categories (2-digit HS) in 2011 were: Optic and Medical Instruments ($7.7 billion), Machinery ($5.7 billion), Cereals (corn and wheat) ($5.6 billion), Electrical Machinery ($5.0 billion), and Aircraft ($4.8 billion).

U.S. exports of agricultural products to Japan totaled $14.1 billion in 2011, our 4th largest export market. Leading categories include: coarse grains ($3.9 billion), red meats (fresh/chilled/frozen) ($2.8 billion), wheat ($1.4 billion), and soybeans ($954 million).

U.S. exports of private commercial services* (i.e., excluding military and government) to Japan were $47.0 billion in 2011 (preliminary data), 5% ($2.3 billion) more than 2010 and 43% greater than 2000 levels. Other private services (business, professional, and technical services and financial services), travel, and the royalties and license fees categories accounted for most of U.S. services exports to Japan.

Japan was the United States= 4th largest supplier of goods imports in 2011.

U.S. goods imports from Japan totaled $128.8 billion in 2011, a 6.9% increase ($8.3 billion) from 2010, but down 12.1% from 2000. U.S. imports from Japan accounted for 5.8% of overall U.S. imports in 2011.

The five largest import categories in 2011 were: Vehicles ($41.0 billion), Machinery ($31.2 billion), Electrical Machinery ($18.3 billion), Optic and Medical Instruments ($6.9 billion), and Organic Chemicals ($3.0 billion).

U.S. imports of agricultural products from Japan totaled $586 million in 2011. Leading categories include: snack foods (including chocolate) ($54 million), wine and beer ($53 million), and processed fruit and vegetables ($36 million).

U.S. imports of private commercial services* (i.e., excluding military and government) were $24.8 billion in 2011 (preliminary data) up 5% ($1.3 billion) from 2010, and up 51% from the 2000 level. The royalties and license fees, the other private services (business, professional, and technical services), and the other transportation (freight services) categories accounted for most of U.S. services imports from Japan

The U.S. goods trade deficit with Japan was $62.6 billion in 2011, a 4.3% increase ($2.6 billion) over 2010. The U.S. goods trade deficit with Japan accounted for 8.6% of the overall U.S. goods trade deficit in 2011.

Trade in Japan

The United States has a services trade surplus of $22.2 billion with Japan in 2011 (preliminary data), up 5% from 2010.

On March 31 1854 representatives of Japan and the United States signed a historic treaty. A United States naval officer, Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry, negotiated tirelessly for several months with Japanese officials to achieve the goal of opening the doors of trade with Japan.

For two centuries, Japanese ports were closed to all but a few Dutch and Chinese traders. The United States hoped Japan would agree to open certain ports so American vessels could begin to trade with the mysterious island kingdom. In addition to interest in the Japanese market, America needed Japanese ports to replenish coal and supplies for the commercial whaling fleet.

On July 8,1853 four black ships led by USS Powhatan and commanded by Commodore Matthew Perry, anchored at Edo (Tokyo) Bay. Never before had the Japanese seen ships steaming with smoke. They thought the ships were "giant dragons puffing smoke." They did not know that steamboats existed and were shocked by the number and size of the guns on board the ships.

At age 60, Matthew Perry had a long and distinguished naval career. He knew that the mission to Japan would be his most significant accomplishment. He brought a letter from the President of the United States, Millard Fillmore, to the Emperor of Japan. He waited with his armed ships and refused to see any of the lesser dignitaries sent by the Japanese, insisting on dealing only with the highest emissaries of the Emperor.

 The Americans admired the courtesy and politeness of their hosts, and thought very highly of the rich Japanese culture. Commodore Perry broke down barriers that separated Japan from the rest of the world. Today the Japanese celebrate his expedition with annual black ship festivals. Perry lived in Newport, Rhode Island, which also celebrates a Black Ship festival in July. In Perry's honor, Newport has become Shimoda's sister city.

MITI was created with the split of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in May 1949 and given the mission for coordinating international trade policy with other groups, such as the Bank of Japan, the Economic planning Agency, and the various commerce-related cabinet ministries. At the time it was created, Japan was still recovering from the economic disaster of World War II. With inflation rising and productivity failing to keep up, the government sought a better mechanism for reviving the Japanese economy.

MITI has been responsible not only in the areas of exports and imports but also for all domestic industries and businesses not specifically covered by other ministries in the areas of investment in plant and equipment, pollution control, energy and power, some aspects of foreign economic assistance, and consumer complaints. This span has allowed MITI to integrate conflicting policies, such as those on pollution control and export competitiveness, to minimize damage to export industries.

MITI has served as an architect of industrial policy, an arbiter on industrial problems and disputes, and a regulator. A major objective of the ministry has been to strengthen the country's industrial base. It has not managed Japanese trade and industry along the lines of a centrally planned economy, but it has provided industries with administrative guidance and other direction, both formal and informal, on modernization, technology, investments in new plants and equipment, and domestic and foreign competition.

MITI lost some influence when the switch was made to a floating exchange rate between the United States dollar and yen in 1971. Before that point, MITI had been able to keep the exchange rate artificially low, which benefited Japan's exporters. Later, intense lobbying from other countries, particularly the United States, pushed Japan to introduce more liberal trade laws that further lessened MITI's grip over the Japanese economy. By the mid-1980s, the ministry was helping foreign corporations set up operations in Japan.

The decline of MITI was described Johnstone:

... by the early 1980s, when Western analysts first became aware of MITI, the ministry's glory days were over. In 1979 MITI lost its primary instrument of control over Japanese firms — allocation of foreign currency. The power, that is, to decide who could — and who could not — import technologies. [For example] ... MITI bureaucrats attempted to deny fledling Sony the $25,000 the company needed to license transistor technology from Western Electric.

The declining significance of MITI to Japanese companies made it a less powerful agency within the bureaucracy, and by the end of the 20th century, it was folded into a larger body. In 2001, it was reorganized into the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI)

Matthew Perry was the son of Sarah Wallace (Alexander) and Navy Captain, Christopher R. Perry and the younger brother of Oliver Hazard Perry. Matthew Perry received a midshipman's commission in the Navy in 1809, and was initially assigned to the USS Revenge, under the command of his elder brother. Under his brother's command, Matthew was a combatant in The Battle of Lake Erie aboard the Flagship Lawrence and the replacement flagship, Niagara.

Matthew's early career saw him assigned to several ships, including the USS President where he served as an aid to Commodore John Rodgers (1772–1838), which had been in a victorious engagement over a British vessel, HMS Little Belt, shortly before the War of 1812 was officially declared. He continued in this capacity during the War of 1812. Perry was also aboard the President when it engaged the HMS Belvidera when Rodgers himself fired the first shot of the war at this vessel with a following shot that resulted in a cannon bursting, wounding Rodgers and Perry and killing and wounding others. Perry transferred to the USS United States, and saw little fighting in the war after that, since the ship was trapped in port at New London, Connecticut. Following the signing of the Treaty of Ghent which ended the conflict, he served on various vessels in the Mediterranean. Perry served under Commodore William Bainbridge during the Second Barbary War. He then served in African waters aboard USS Cyane during its patrol off Liberia from 1819-1820. After that cruise, Perry was sent to suppress piracy and the slave trade in the West Indies. Later during this period, while in port in Russia, Perry was offered a commission in the Imperial Russian Navy, which he declined.

 Perry had an ardent interest and saw the need for the naval education, supporting an apprentice system to train new seamen, and helped establish the curriculum for the United States Naval Academy. He was a vocal proponent of modernizing the Navy. Once promoted to captain, he oversaw construction of the Navy's second steam frigate the USS Fulton, which he commanded after its completion. He was called "The Father of the Steam Navy", and he organized America's first corps of naval engineers, and conducted the first U.S. naval gunnery school while commanding Fulton in 1839-1841 off Sandy Hook on the coast of New Jersey.

 erry returned in February 1854 with twice as many ships, finding that the delegates had prepared a treaty embodying virtually all the demands in Fillmore's letter. Perry signed the Convention of Kanagawa on March 31, 1854 and departed, mistakenly believing the agreement had been made with imperial representatives.The agreement was made with the Shogun, the de facto ruler of Japan.

 

Trade in Japan

Japanese 1854 print relating Perry's visit.

On his way to Japan, Perry anchored off Keelung in Formosa (modern day Taiwan), for ten days. Perry and crew members landed on Formosa and investigated the potential of mining the coal deposits in that area. He emphasized in his reports that Formosa provided a convenient mid-way trade location. Formosa was also very defensible. It could serve as a base for exploration as Cuba had done for the Spanish in the Americas. Occupying Formosa could help the US to counter European monopolization of the major trade routes. President Franklin Pierce declined the suggestion, remarking such a remote possession would be an unnecessary drain of resources and that he would be unlikely to receive the consent of Congress.

A group of Japanese aerospace company representatives traveled to Mexico in May to learn about the country’s aerospace manufacturing footprint and engineering prowess in the development of the industry. The group visited aerospace clusters in the cities of Queretaro, Chihuahua, Mexicali and Tijuana, which together concentrate more than half of the country’s aerospace manufacturing.  

he history of exchange between Japan and the Netherlands started when the Rotterdam ship "de Liefde" drifted ashore in Japan in 1600. From the end of the 16th to the beginning of the 17th century, during the warring states period, Japanese culture was strongly influenced by Portugal and Spain.

In 1639, the Tokugawa Shogunate prohibited the Portuguese from visiting Japan and decided to continue official trade only with the Netherlands. In 1641, the Dutch Factory of the VOC was relocated from Hirado to Deshina in Nagasaki and trade between Japan and the Netherlands entered a new stage. At this time, the Netherlands was the only country that provided Japan with western culture. During the Edo period western culture into Japan was almost exclusively imported through the Dutch Factory of the VOC in Nagasaki.

The celebration of the 400 year cultural and economical exchange between Japan and the Netherlands has induced us to compose some web pages and offerings of a number of beautiful, rare and important items with an accent on this unique relationship between both countries.

The European Commission will next Wednesday (18 July) ask member states for a mandate to start talks with Japan on a bilateral free-trade deal. 

Advocates of a free-trade deal between the world's fourth and fifth-largest economies are urging speed, highlighting the potential to help the European Union's economic recovery. However, a third of the EU's member states have reservations about Japan's readiness for a deal and about the mandate that the Commission is seeking.

At a meeting of trade ministers on 30 May, some countries argued that the 12-month scoping exercise conducted to test the potential for an agreement should have probed more deeply about Japan's commitment to reaching a deal. The Commission refused to re-open the scoping exercise and insists that it has “clear commitments written in stone” from Japan that would not normally be made at this stage.

According to diplomats and EU officials, those countries that will push for a tougher negotiating mandate include four of the EU's largest economies: Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. The others are Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. 

The car industry is an area of particular concern. Manufacturers believe that Japan's standards and regulations – non-tariff barriers – contribute to making it 30% more costly to own a European car than a Japanese care.

There are also doubts about non-tariff barriers in the health sector, and about rules for public tenders. The prospects of agreement on public procurement have, however, improved, as the EU, Japan and the US agreed in December to open up their markets for public contracts.

Arguments for a quick agreement between the Commission and member states, an EU official said, include the EU's need for growth and the political situation in Japan, where the government is pushing through reforms against a backdrop of waning public support and divisions within the ruling party.

According to a Japanese official, the date of this year's EU-Japan summit will be set only once the EU has agreed on a mandate for free-trade talks. His EU contacts suggest that the aim is to agree a mandate at the European Council in October. That would open up the possibility of a summit in November, probably in Tokyo.

The trade mandate will also affect progress on signing a framework agreement between Japan and the EU. That agreement will be debated by European commissioners at their 18 July meeting. 

Trade in Japan